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NEW LOOKS AT AN ANCIENT WRIT: HABEAS CORPUS
REEXAMINED
Andrew P. Miller*
Robert E. Shepherd, Jr.**
[T]he traditional characterization of the writ of habeas corpus as an
original ... civil remedy for the enforcement of the right to personal
liberty, rather than as a stage of the state criminal proceedings or as
an appeal therefrom . . . cannot be permitted to defeat the manifest
federal policy that federal constitutional rights of personal liberty
shall not be denied without the fullest opportunity for plenary federal
judicial review. Brennan, J.'
[Ilt is difficult to explain why a system of criminal justice deserves
respect which allows repetitive reviews of convictions long since held
to have been final at the end of the normal process of trial and appeal
where the basis for re-examination is not even that the convicted
defendant was innocent. There has been a halo about the "Great
Writ" that no one would wish to dim. Yet one must wonder whether
the stretching of its use far beyond any justifiable purpose will not
in the end weaken rather than strengthen the writ's vitality. Powell,
J.2
These decade-spanning statements regarding the appropriate role
for federal habeas corpus in the collateral review of state criminal
convictions represent far more than a shift in judicial philosophy3
from the "Warren Court" to the "Burger Court."' They typify the
* Attorney General of Virginia. A.B., Princeton University, 1954; LL.B., University of
Virginia, 1960.
** Assistant Attorney General of Virginia and Adjunct Associate Professor of Law, T.C.
Williams School of Law; B.A., 1959, LL.B., 1961, Washington and Lee University.
1. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 423-24 (1963) (footnotes omitted).
2. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 275 (1973) (concurring opinion).
3. For an article expounding the thesis that the dissension often evident in fourth amend-
ment cases is indicative of a profound disagreement among the Justices about fundamental
principles, see Irons, The Burger Court: Discord in Search and Seizure, 8 U. RIcH. L. Rv.
433 (1973).
4. For the purposes of this article, the period of time during which the Supreme Court of
the United States may be viewed and aptly described as the "Warren Court" runs from
October 5, 1953 to June 23, 1969, the period of time when Earl Warren served as Chief Justice.
The ascendancy of the "Burger Court" may be argued as beginning on December 15, 1971,
when Justice William H. Rehnquist was sworn in. The Court then consisted of four Nixon
appointees-Chief Justice Warren Burger and Associate Justices Harry A. Blackmun, Lewis
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persistent debate over the role of the federal courts in the post-
conviction review of state judgments that has been remarkable for
the polarity that has characterized the opposing viewpoints.- In the
course of that debate the views of Mr. Justice Powell have slowly
but persistently been gaining acceptance. The purpose of this article
is to focus briefly on the history of the writ of habeas corpus6 in the
Supreme Court of the United States and in the Virginia Supreme
Court, to survey the development of the modern role of habeas
corpus, to concentrate on the recent decisions of the United States
Supreme Court in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte7 and related cases
and of the Virginia Supreme Court in Slayton v. Parrigan,8 and,
finally, to attempt to draw some conclusions about the possible
direction the courts may and should take in the foreseeable future
regarding habeas corpus.
A BRIEF HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS
The precise origin of the writ of habeas corpus is not known, but
as early as 1199 A.D. orders were issued directing English sheriffs
to produce parties before courts.9 In Tyrel's Case in 1214 an order
was entered using the words "haberet. . . corpus" to direct a sheriff
F. Powell, Jr., and William Rehnquist; three judicial "liberals"-Associate Justices William
0. Douglas, William J. Brennan, Jr., and Thurgood Marshall; and two "swing
men"-Associate Justices Potter Stewart and Byron R. White. This assessment of the Court
may be somewhat simplistic but it is nevertheless useful in analyzing developments in the
fields of criminal law, criminal procedure and habeas corpus.
5. The proliferation of articles concerning habeas corpus has been described by one com-
mentator as "a 'flood of stale, frivolous, and repetitious' law review articles [that] inundate
the legal periodicals of our country .. ", thus paraphrasing the oft-quoted phrase of Mr.
Justice Jackson in Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 536-37 (1953). Comment, In Search of the
Optimum Writ: A Suggestion for the Improvement of Federal Habeas Corpus, 22 J. PUB. L.
465, 466 (1973), wherein the author estimates that from "[Sleptember 1964 until August
1973, there were close to 200 symposia, articles, comments, and notes on the general topic of
habeas corpus .. " Id. at 465.
6. There have been through history several different forms of habeas corpus-ad
respondendum; ad satisfaciendum; testificandum, deliberandum; and ad faciendum et
recipiendum-most of which are now archaic. See 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES* 129-30;
D. MEADOR, HABEAS CORPUS AND MAGNA CHARTA 7-9, 12 (1966) [hereinafter cited as MEADOR].
When used in this article the term "habeas corpus" is intended to refer to the common law
writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, often described as the "Great Writ." Ex parte Boll-
man, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 95 (1807).
7. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
8. 215 Va. 27, 205 S.E.2d 680 (1974).
9. MEADOR at 8.
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to bring a person before the king; such orders were regularly used
for the purpose of getting a party before a court so that a case could
be tried.' In other words, the writ was originally a process by which
courts compelled the attendance of parties to facilitate the adjudi-
cation of litigation." The role of habeas corpus was constantly
changing, however, and by the early seventeeth century:
[Tihe writ of habeas corpus had evolved into an independent writ,
not auxiliary to any other proceeding. It was a device whereby a court
could inquire into the legality of detention and could order a dis-
charge if the detention was found illegal. The writ had also become
differentiated into several new forms. For constitutional history the
most important was the habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, used where
the petitioner was held under a criminal charge. From that point
forward, attention focuses on the question of what constitutes unlaw-
ful detention.' 2
The first major test of habeas corpus as thus constituted came in
Darnel's Case'3 in 1627, when four English subjects imprisoned for
refusing to make loans to an impecunious Charles I sought release
on the ground that the king lacked the authority to hold them solely
on his special command. The court accepted the jailer's return and
refused to look behind it, although it acknowledged that where the
cause for commitment appeared in the return, the court had the
power to review the legality of the detention. 4 The prisoners' case
was lost but Parliament responded in 1628 with the Petition of
Right,' 5 which required that the cause of commitment be shown in
a return if a prisoner of the Crown was to be detained. Thirteen
years later, with the effect of the Petition of Right largely negated
by judicial interpretation,'" Parliament struck again at the king's
10. Id.
11. Id. at 9; Note, Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HA.v. L. REV.
1038, 1042 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Developments]; Oaks, Legal History in the High
Court -Habeas Corpuw, 64 MICH. L. REv. 451, 459 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Oaks].
12. MEADOR at 12-13. See aLso 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 114 (1926)
]hereinafter cited as HOLDSWORTH1.
13. 3 Cobbett's St. Tr. 1 (1627). See 9 HOLDSWORTH 114; MEADOR at 13-19. See also 6
HoLDswoRTH 34-37.
14. 3 Cobbett's St. Tr. 1, 51-57 (1629).
15. 3 Car. I, c. 1 (1628).
16. See, e.g., Stroud's Case, 3 Cobbett's St. Tr. 235 (1629); 6 HOLDSWORTH 39 n.6.
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power in the Act of 1641'1 abolishing the Star Chamber and remov-
ing the power of the king to arrest without "probable cause.'8
The struggle for dominance between the Crown and the Parlia-
ment, in which the writ of habeas corpus had become a symbolic
tool, was interrupted by the reign of Cromwell and the Common-
wealth from 1649 to 1660. Upon restoration of the monarchy,
Charles II exploited defects in the writ to imprison subjects, and
Parliament responded with the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679.19 This
Act did not plug all the procedural gaps in the "Great Writ", but it
materially strengthened the power of common law courts to release
prisoners arbitrarily detained by the king and council. The Act spe-
cifically excluded from its coverage persons confined as a result of
a criminal conviction."0 The old test of judicial detentions-the ju-
risdictional competence of the committing court-was the sole point
of inquiry in cases of this nature.2'
A. Habeas Corpus in America
Although the Habeas Corpus Act itself was never extended to the
American colonies, the colonists, with Coke's Institutes and
Blackstone's Commentaries as basic legal treatises, viewed the writ
of habeas corpus as a part of the fundamental common law rights
of Englishmen, wherever they might be. 2 Following independence
from England and up until the time of the Federal Constitutional
Convention of 1787, the writ of habeas corpus was mentioned in the
constitutions of less than half the states, probably because of the
view that the common law writ was so well established as to render
17. 16 Car. I, c. 10, §§ III, VIII (1641).
18. The Act provided that a prisoner would have immediate access to a writ of habeas
corpus and the court "shall proceed to examine and determine whether the cause of such
commitment appearing upon the . . . return be just and legal, or not. Id. at § VIII.
19. 31 Car. 2, c. 2 (1679). See generally 6 HOLDSWORTH 142-63.
20. 31 Car. 2, c. 2, § III (1679).
21. During the course of Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion in Fay v. Noia, he stated that
"[W]hen habeas corpus practice was codified in the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, . . .no
distinction was made between executive and judicial detentions." 372 U.S. at 403 (citations
and footnotes omitted). This view of the historical effect of the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 is
seriously questioned by other authorities. See MEADOR at 26-27; Oaks at 454 n.20.
22. MEADOR at 30-31; Carpenter, Habeas Corpus in the Colonies, 8 AM. Hsw. REV. 18, 19-
21 (1903). For a brief discussion of the writ of habeas corpus in early Virginia see the text
accompanying notes 72-88 infra.
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a constitutional provision unnecessary. 3 In the years following rati-
fication of the United States Constitution, however, practically all
the states incorporated into their constitutions provisions patterned
after the federal suspension clause.24
Surprisingly, the only mention in the United States Constitution
of the writ of habeas corpus is in the suspension clause-a provision
that arguably serves only to limit the power of Congress.2 5 Several
authorities have argued, quite persuasively, that at the time of the
Constitutional Convention of 1787 no federal writ of habeas corpus
was necessary. Each state had the writ available and any person
confined within the state was afforded its protection, including fed-
eral prisoners.2 1 Consequently, it is probable that the framers of the
Constitution did not view that document as creating a right to a
federal writ, but only as limiting the power of the Congress to sus-
pend habeas corpus as afforded by the states.21
In any event, there was nothing in the historical background of
the writ of habeas corpus at the time of the Constitutional Conven-
tion to indicate that a prisoner convicted by a court of general
criminal jurisdiction was ever entitled to the writ. The framers were
concerned about the misuse and abuse of executive power and the
first Congress undoubtedly did not view the suspension clause as
implicitly establishing an affirmative right to the writ. If they had
read the clause to do so, they would not have deemed it necessary
in the Judiciary Act of 17 89 28 to give the federal courts explicit power
23. MEADOR at 31-32; Chafee, The Most Important Human Right in the Constitution, 32
BosT. U.L. REv. 143, 146 (1952); Oaks, Habeas Corpus in the States-1776-1865, 32 U. CHI.
L. REv. 243, 247 (1965).
24. Oaks, supra note 23, at 249. E.g., compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, note 25 infra, with
VA. CONST. art. I, § 9, note 114 infra.
25. "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in
cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl.2.
See Collings, Habeas Corpus for Convicts-Constitutional Right or Legislative Grace?, 40
CALIF. L. REv. 335, 344-45 (1952) [hereinafter cited as Collings].
26. MEADOR at 32-33; Warren, Federal and State Court Interference, 42 HARv. L. REv. 345,
353 (1930). It was not until the middle of the nineteenth century that the Supreme Court
ended state court access for federal prisoners. Tarble's Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1871);
Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1858).
27. MEADOR at 33; Collings at 344-45. One possible reason for this conclusion and for the
fact that no affirmative provision for habeas corpus exists in either the Constitution or the
Bill of Rights may be the existence of the sixth amendment, which guarantees the right to a
speedy trial and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation-everything of
substance protected by the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 in England.
28. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, wherein the federal courts were empow-
1974]
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and jurisdiction to issue the writ. The conclusion is inescapable that
under the United States Constitution, at least as viewed in 1789, a
convicted prisoner had no right to habeas corpus. Such a right
would have to be established by Congress. 9
Early cases in the United States Supreme Court recognized the
statutory, rather than Constitutional, origins of the power to grant
the writ. In Turner v. Bank of North America"0 Justice Chase stated:
The notion has frequently been entertained, that the federal courts
derive their judicial power, immediately from the constitution; but
the political truth is, that the disposal of the judicial power (except
in a few specified instances) belongs to Congress. If Congress has
given the power to this Court, we possess it, not otherwise; and if
Congress has not given the power to us, or to any other Court, it still
remains at the legislative disposal."
Eight years later Chief Justice Marshall dealt with the power of the
high court to issue the writ and he concluded that any "power to
award the writ by any of the courts of the United States, must be
given by written law." 2 The Judiciary Act of 1789 must have been,
in his view, the "efficient means by which this great constitutional
privilege should receive life and activity. . . .,33
In 1830, in Ex parte Watkins,34 Chief Justice Marshall again ad-
dressed himself to the scope of the writ when he stated that "no law
of the United States prescribes the cases in which this great writ
shall be issued. . . .The term is used in the Constitution as one
which was well understood. . . ,,13 Although Marshall recognized
that the existence of the right to habeas corpus was established by
the Judiciary Act of 1789, the scope of the writ was delineated by
ered to issue writs of habeas corpus to prisoners "in custody under or by colour of the
authority of the United States .... Id. at 81-82.
29. Collings at 345.
30. 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 8 (1799).
31. Id. at 10 n.1.
32. Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 94 (1807).
33. Id. at 95. Some years later, in Exparte Vearney, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 38 (1822), the Court
held that a contempt conviction by the District of Columbia Circuit Court would not be
reviewed on habeas corpus, despite the allegation that the contempt arose from a refusal to
answer a question the prisoner considered incriminating.
34. 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193 (1830).
35. Id. at 201.
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the common law, as expressed by the English Act of 1679. In refer-
ence to this Act, Marshall stated:
This statute may be referred to as describing the cases in which relief
is, in England, afforded by this writ to a person detained in custody.
It enforces the common law. This statute excepts from those who are
entitled to its benefit persons committed for felony or treason, plainly
expressed in the warrant, as well as persons convicted or in execu-
tion.36
Of significance to our current understanding of the scope and role
of habeas corpus is Chief Justice Marshall's denial of the-writ on the
ground that the petitioner was committed under a criminal convic-
tion and "an imprisonment under a judgment cannot be unlawful,
unless that judgment be an absolute nullity; and it is not a nullity
if the court has general jurisdiction of the subject, although it should
be erroneous."3 This was essentially the posture of the writ at the
time of the passage of the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867.8 Nine years
later, in Ex parte Parks,39 a federal prisoner was denied habeas
corpus relief on the ground that it afforded no relief to a person
detained under the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction.
This same view persisted for prisoners detained under state convic-
tions as well as federal prisoners. In 1875 Justice Joseph Bradley,
sitting on circuit, granted a state prisoner habeas corpus relief after
concluding that a pre-empting federal law deprived the state court
of jurisdiction. He added, however, that:
If it were a case in which the state had jurisdiction of the offense, the
general rule of the common law would intervene, and require that the
prisoner should be remanded, and left to his writ of error. In such a
36. Id. at 201-02. See also McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131, 136 (1934).
37. 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 203. See note 33 supra. Over a century later, in Fay v. Noia, a
majority of the Court made an effort to refute the notion that this was the scope of habeas
corpus in England, and at the time of the framing of the Constitution. 372 U.S. at 426. But
Mr. Justice Powell, in Schneckloth, comments on the Fay view in the following incisive terms:
If this were a correct interpretation of the relevant history, the present wide scope
accorded the writ would have arguable support, despite the impressive reasons to the
contrary. But recent scholarship has cast grave doubt on Fay's version of the writ's
historic function. 412 U.S. at 253.
See also MEADOR at 60-61; Oaks, supra note 23, at 262.
38. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385 (now 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (1964)).
39. 93 U.S. 18 (1876).
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case, although the judgment were erroneous, the imprisonment would
not be in violation of the constitution or laws of the United States. 0
Ex parte Lange" represented the first departure from these histor-
ical boundaries when the Court granted relief to a prisoner who had
been convicted of a federal offense and had paid the fine imposed,
only to be resentenced by the trial court to a year's imprisonment.
The Court predicated its grant of the writ on the rationale that the
satisfaction of the original sentence terminated the lower court's
jurisdiction, thus beginning "a long process of expansion of the con-
cept of a lack of 'jurisdiction.' ",42 Following the same rubric of "ju-
risdiction" in Ex parte Siebold43 and Ex parte Wilson,44 the Court
stated that the constitutionality of the statute under which a pris-
oner was convicted could be examined and that the total absence
of any indictment would entitle a prisoner to relief. These cases all
involved federal prisoners, however, and it was not until 1886 that
the Court first heard a case from a state prisoner.45
An expanding view of due process rights for state defendants cou-
pled with a concern for deference to state judiciaries caused continu-
ing problems for the Supreme Court in deciding habeas corpus peti-
tions. In Frank v. Mangum the Court rejected a state prisoner's
claim that he had been denied due process by an allegedly mob-
dominated trial and affirmed the district court's denial of the writ.
However, some new and germinal concepts were introduced by the
Court's view that mob domination could result in a denial of due
process, in which event the conviction would have been entered by
a court without "jurisdiction" and relief could be granted. This was
a somewhat radical detour along the road of "jurisdiction." The
40. Ex porte Bridges, 4 Fed. Cas. 98, 106 (No. 1862) (C.C.N.D. Ga. 1875). This view of the
Act of 1867 as not altering the traditional common law scope of habeas corpus was typical.
E.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 453 (1963) (dissenting opinion of Justice Harlan); Brown v.
Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 532-33 (1953) (concurring opinion of Justice Jackson).
41. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873).
42. Hart, Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, The Supreme Court, 1958 Term, 73
Harv. L. Rev. 84, 104 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Hart].
43. 100 U.S. 371 (1879).
44. 114 U.S. 417 (1885).
45. Ex parte Royal, 117 U.S. 241 (1886). The Court expressed an "exhaustion of state
remedies" policy in this case by asserting that a federal writ would normally be denied until
completion of state trial court proceedings.
46. 237 U.S. 309 (1915).
[Vol. 9: 49
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result in Frank was dictated by the Court's view that the ultimate
question under the 1867 Act was whether the prisoner was in cus-
tody "in violation of the constitution" and the resolution of that test
was determined by the fairness of the state "corrective process"
to test federal constitutional claims. The essential inquiry focused
on the state's panoply of procedures for adjudicating such claims
rather than on the substantive claim itself.47
Moore v. Dempsey8 followed Frank by only eight years and the
claim of mob domination was similar to that in the earlier case.
Despite the fact that the Arkansas Supreme Court had considered
the prisoner's federal claim, the Court reversed and ordered the
federal district judge to determine the merits of the allegation for
himself. The Court did not enunciate any criteria for such a reexam-
ination and it did not specifically overrule Frank, but the decision
could be explained by the more cursory review of the federal claim
in the Arkansas courts than the Georgia courts had afforded in
Frank." The Court continued to discuss due process claims in terms
of the "jurisdiction" of the trial court and it reiterated the caveat
that habeas corpus could not be used as a substitute for a writ of
error." In Waley v. Johnston5 the Court abandoned the "jurisdic-
tion" fiction and expressly acknowledged that constitutional claims
as well as jurisdictional questions were cognizable on habeas corpus
review.-2
The abandonment of the Frank definition of habeas corpus review
47. MEADOR at 62-64; Developments at 1050.
48. 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
49. Professor Hart views Frank as being "substantially discredited" by Moore (Hart at
105), while Professor Reitz asserts that Moore "overruled" Frank. Reitz, Federal Habeas
Corpus: Impact of an Abortive State Proceeding, 74 HARv. L. REV. 1315, 1329 (1961)
[hereinafter cited as Reitz]. Professor Bator, on the contrary, views the two decisions as
being consistent, as he ascribes considerable weight to the differing attention paid to the
federal claims in the two states. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus
for State Prisoners, 76 HARv. L. REV. 441, 489 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Bator]. A different
explanation is the change in Supreme Court jurisdiction that took place between Frank and
Moore, whereby due process claims of a state criminal proceedings were no longer reviewable
by direct appeal in the Supreme Court but were only cognizable through the discretionary
certiorari jurisdiction of the Court. See Developments at 1053-54.
50. See, e.g., Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 91 (1923); Frank v. Magnum, 237 U.S. 309,
326 (1915).
51. 316 U.S. 101 (1942).
52. Id. at 104-05.
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was finally made clear by the Supreme Court's 1953 decision in
Brown v. Allen. 3 In Brown, a state criminal defendant asserted
violations of the fourteenth amendment in the jury selection process
and in the admissibility of a confession. The questions were fully
litigated in the state courts without success and the United States
Supreme Court denied direct review. The prisoner then initiated a
habeas corpus petition in the federal district court, attacking not
the state procedures for the adjudication of his federal claims, but
challenging instead the correctness of the state court decisions. The
district court rejected the claims on their merits and the court of
appeals and the Supreme Court affirmed.
Under Frank there could have been no federal habeas corpus re-
view on the merits and the sole question would have been the ade-
quacy of the state corrective process. 4 The Brown decision treated
that prior ultimate question as irrelevant and established that on
federal habeas corpus filed by a state prisoner the federal courts
could review and decide the merits of the alleged federal claim
without initial resort to the adequacy of state process question.5 In
addition, the federal district judge was not limited to the state
record; he could hold an evidentiary hearing and make new findings
of fact. 6
Brown had no immediate impact despite the contemporaneous
enlargement in due process and equal protection rights by the Su-
preme Court of the United States. One reason for the delayed reac-
tion was the case of Daniels v. Allen,57 a companion case to Brown
v. Allen. The defendant in Daniels had asserted the same federal
constitutional claims that were asserted in Brown but the prisoner
had not previously perfected an appeal of his conviction to the state
supreme court. Consequently, the state courts affirmed the convic-
tion without passing on the federal questions. A federal habeas cor-
pus petition was filed, but the Supreme Court denied relief solely
on the ground that the petitioner had waived the claims by failing
to assert them in accordance with state law and his custody was
.53. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
54. MEADOR at 65-66.
55. 344 U.S. at 508.
56. Id. at 463, 503, 506.
57. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
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therefore not "in violation of the Constitution.""8 In essence, the
Court's holding had the effect of giving immunity to a state convic-
tion on federal habeas corpus appeal if it was similarly immune
from review on direct appeal because it rested on an adequate state
ground. One commentator has pointed out that "by this view, such
a state conviction is not subject to federal judicial scrutiny at any
level by any procedure." 9
For a decade after Brown and Daniels the Supreme Court steadily
and persistently spawned new rights for state criminal defendants
through an expanding view of the due process and equal protection
clauses.6" As long as Daniels stood intact, state criminal procedural
rules could effectively bar federal collateral relief, and there was a
high degree of finality to a conviction where no federal question was
raised in the course of the trial and appeal.' Finally, in 1963, the
issue posed in Daniels was met and resolved by a 6-3 decision of the
Supreme Court in Fay v. Noia,2 along with the contemporaneous
cases of Townsend v. Sain,6 Sanders v. United States,64 and Jones
v. Cunningham.5
In Fay and Townsend, the beacon lights for those who favor the
concept of an expanded federal writ of habeas corpus, the Court
formulated a rule that may be summarized as follows: habeas cor-
pus may be invoked by a state prisoner, after the exhaustion of
available state remedies, to review alleged violations of federal con-
stitutional claims in state criminal proceedings, regardless of any
prior state court determinations of those rights.66 The federal dis-
trict court must hold an evidentiary hearing under any of these
conditions: (1) the merits of any factual dispute were not deter-
mined at a state hearing; (2) the state adjudication of the merits of
any such dispute is not fairly supported by the record; (3) the fact-
58. Id. at 485.
59. MEADOR at 68-69.
60. See generally Whitley v. Steiner, 293 F.2d 895 (4th Cir. 1961); MEADoR at 69; Hart,
supra note 42; Reitz, supra note 49.
61. MEADOR at 69.
62. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
63. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
64. 373 U.S. 1 (1963).
65. 371 U.S. 236 (1963).
66. 372 U.S. at 312. See Hopkins, Federal Habeas Corpus: Easing the Tension Between
State and Federal Courts, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 660, 662 (1970).
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finding procedure utilized in the state courts is not adequate for a
full and fair hearing; (4) there is a substantial allegation of newly
discovered evidence; (5) the material facts were not developed ade-
quately at state hearings; or (6) if, for any reason, the prisoner was
not afforded a full and fair hearing in the state courts."7 Even under
the Fay-Townsend rule, however, a petitioner may still be deemed
to have waived his federal claims if he:
[U]nderstandingly and knowingly forewent the privilege of seeking
to vindicate his federal claims in the state courts, whether for stra-
tegic, tactical, or any other reasons that can fairly be described as the
deliberate by-passing of state procedures .... 11
Sanders stands primarily for the proposition that the doctrine of res
judicata does not serve to bar successive habeas corpus petitions,
although the rejection of the same claim in an earlier proceeding
may be considered by the habeas court. In Jones the Court retreated
from its earlier position that habeas corpus could be used only to
test actual physical custody by a respondent, and extended habeas
corpus to allow relief to a prisoner released on parole."
The immediate effect of the 1963 decisions was to stimulate a vast
increase in the number of habeas corpus petitions. In just five years
the number of petitions filed by state prisoners rose from 1,903 in
1963 to over 6,300 in 1968, an increase of 286 per cent.70 This expan-
sion in the number, as well as the role, of habeas corpus petitions
led to considerable irritation on the part of state judiciaries and a
number of ameliorative proposals, including legislation, were made
67. 372 U.S. at 313. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244 for the codification of this rule.
68. 372 U.S. at 439 (emphasis added).
69. 371 U.S. at 243. This represented a substantial break with the past and especially with
the prior decision of Wales v. Whitney, 114 U.S. 564 (1885), where the Court had held that a
naval officer confined to the city limits of Washington, D.C. was not sufficiently restrained
and that:
Something more than moral restraint is necessary to make a case for habeas corpus.
There must be actual confinement or the present means of enforcing it. Id. at 571-72.
In Jones the Court relied primarily on cases involving the use of the writ in child custody
cases and cases involving the exclusion of aliens to support its position. Developments at 1073
n.6; Oaks at 468-71.
70. DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT
130 (1968). See also State Post-Conviction Remedies and Federal Habeas Corpus, 12 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 147 (1970).
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but to date all of these proposals have failed.7 1 With a few accretions
along the way, the 1963 decisions of the Supreme Court constituted
the law of federal habeas corpus at the time that the Burger Court
came into its ascendancy.
B. Habeas Corpus in Virginia
As previously discussed, the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 was never
extended to the American colonies. 71 In Virginia, however, one of
Governor Spotswood's first acts was to extend the writ to the colony
in 1710 on behalf of Queen Anne, and both houses of the General
Assembly expressed their thanks for her:
Majesty's late favor to this country in allowing us the benefit of the
habeas corpus act, and in appointing courts of oyer and terminer for
the more speedy execution of justice and relief from long imprison-
ment .
3
Despite this history, the Virginia Constitution of 1776 contained no
reference to the writ of habeas corpus,74 although the writ of habeas
corpus cum causa had previously been authorized by statute.7" Prior
to the convening of the federal Constitutional Convention in 1787,
only five states had passed habeas corpus acts.76 The writ of habeas
71. See, e.g., S. 917, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 702(a) (1968); H.R. 5649,84th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1955). The 1968 Senate bill would have denied federal habeas corpus to state prisoners, or
so went the argument by its sponsors. Paschal, The Constitution and Habeas Corpus, 1970
DUKE L.J. 605, 606-07 (1970).
72. See text accompanying note 22 supra.
73. R. HuRD, HABEAS CORPUS 113 (1858); MEfADOR at 30-31; A. Scorr, CRIMINAL LAW IN
COLONIAL VIRGINIA 58-59 (1930); Collings at 338; Oaks at 338. Governor Spotswood's full
proclamation can be found in Carpenter, supra note 22, at 24-25. Even prior to this action in
1710, however, a habeas corpus proceeding was held in 1682 involving Major Robert Beverly,
Clerk of the burgesses, in connection with the tobacco-cutting riot of that year. Scorr at 58-
59.
74. 2 B. POORE, FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS AND OTHER ORGANIC
LAws 1910-1912 (1877).
75. An Act for establishing a General Court, § 53, 9 Va. Stats. 414 (Hening 1775); Fleming
v. Bradley, 5 Va. (1 Call) 175 (1797). The writ of habeas corpus cum causa was used for the
purpose of removing a civil cause from an inferior court to a superior court. Interestingly,
despite Virginia's early adherence to habeas corpus, the writ was suspended during the War
of Independence. 10 LAWS OF VmwNIA 413-14 (Hening 1822).
76. Oaks, supra note 11, at 251. See an act directing the mode of suing out and prosecuting
writs of habeas corpus, 11 Va. Stats. 408 (Hening 1784). The Virginia act was patterned on
the English Habeas Corpus Act of 1679.
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corpus received its first mention in a Virginia Constitution when the
Constitution of 1830 provided that "the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus shall not in any case be suspended," thus providing
an absolute prohibition against suspension, unlike the United
States Constitution.7
The earliest Virginia case dealing with habeas corpus in the sense
used in this article appears to be Ex parte Pool,78 which acknowl-
edged the power of a Virginia court to issue a writ of habeas corpus
to sailors in the federal navy confined in a Virginia jail for the
federal authorities. Another case involving the question of the legal-
ity of a state's detention of an individual in the military establish-
ment of the federal government is United States v. Cottingham,9
wherein the Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed its prior assertion
of power to issue the writ, but upheld the denial of such relief by
the trial court. An intriguing situation arose in Mann v. Parke,8"
where the Virginia Court of Appeals issued a writ of habeas corpus
to a confederate soldier who was exempted from military service.
This decision was contrary to the prior United States Supreme
Court decision in Ableman v. Booth,8" where the Court finally held
that a state court could not issue the writ for a federal prisoner. Two
other decisions in 1843-Green v. Commonwealth -8 2 and Cropper v.
Commonwealth83-affirmed the right to habeas corpus relief where
a criminal defendant is not brought to trial within the required
number of terms, and the court therefore has no jurisdiction over the
offense.
These cases parallel the decisions during this time of the Supreme
Court of the United States in their concentration on jurisdictional
questions as being preeminently in the ambit of habeas corpus.8 For
77. VA. CONST. art. III, § 11 (1830); 2 B. POORE, supra note 74, at 1916. Compare the
Federal Constitution, note 25 supra.
78. 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 276 (1821). See HURD, supra note 73, at 190-91.
79. 40 Va. (1 Rob.) 615 (1843). See also United States v. Lipscomb, 45 Va. (4 Gratt.) 41
(1847); United States v. Blakeney, 44 Va. (3 Gratt.) 405 (1847).
80. 57 Va. (16 Gratt.) 443 (1864).
81. See note 26 supra. Perhaps the Virginia court is articulating the state's rights philoso-
phy exemplified by secession and by the loose confederation and weak central government
existing in the Confederate States of America.
82. 40 Va. (1 Rob.) 731 (1843).
83. 41 Va. (2 Rob.) 879 (1843).
84. See text accompanying notes 34-40 supra. For an interesting case involving the at-
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example, in Ex parte Rollins 5 the Virginia court expressed the idea
that habeas corpus is limited to jurisdictional questions:
It is a well-established and undisputed principle that mere errors
in the proceedings of a court of competent jurisdiction cannot be
reviewed on habeas corpus. In such case the remedy, if any, is by writ
of error or appeal. But where the proceedings under which the party
complaining is detained in custody are void, as where the court is
without jurisdiction, the same are reviewable on habeas corpus, and
the party will be discharged.8
This theme was reiterated in Ex parte Marx:87
The writ of habeas corpus is not a writ of error. It deals, not with mere
errors or irregularities, but only with such radical defects as render a
proceeding absolutely void. It brings up the body of the prisoner with
the cause of his commitment, and the court can inquire into the
sufficiently [sic] of that cause; but if he be detained in prison by
virtue of a judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, that judg-
ment is in itself sufficient cause. An imprisonment under a judgment
cannot be unlawful unless that judgment be an absolute nullity, and
it is not a nullity if the court or magistrate rendering it had jurisdic-
tion to render it."
The posture of habeas corpus in Virginia remained thus for a num-
ber of years. In McDorman v. Smyth, 9 the court followed the ration-
ale of McNally v. Hill0 in holding that a writ of habeas corpus would
tempted use of habeas corpus to recover custody of a slave, see Ex parte Ball, 43 Va. (2 Gratt.)
588 (1845).
85. 80 Va. 314 (1885). The court recognized that the unconstitutionality of the statute of
conviction would entitle a prisoner to habeas relief.
86. Id. at 316.
87. 86 Va. 40, 9 S.E. 475 (1889).
88. Id. at 43-44, 9 S.E. at 477. Another oft-cited authority is Lacey v. Palmer, 93 Va. 159,
24 S.E. 930 (1896), wherein the court stated:
The office of the writ of habeas corpus is not to determine the guilt or innocence of
the prisoner. The only issue which it presents is whether or not the prisoner is re-
strained of his liberty by due process of law.
A person held under proper process to answer for an offence erected by a statute
enacted within the constitutional power of the Legislature cannot be discharged upon
a writ of habeas corpus, however clear his innocence may be, but must abide his trial
in the mode prescribed by law. Id. at 163-64, 24 S.E. at 931.
89. 187 Va. 522, 47 S.E.2d 441 (1948). See also Smyth v. Holland, 199 Va. 92, 97 S.E.2d
745 (1957).
90. 293 U.S. 131 (1934).
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not lie to review a conviction which was yet to be served and on
which the sentence had not begun to run. The court again noted
that mere irregularities in the indictment, or other pleadings, would
not constitute a ground for habeas corpus relief."
In 1949, in Smyth v. Godwin,92 the Supreme Court of Appeals of
Virginia considered a number of major questions involving habeas
corpus and ruled that despite the constitutional prohibition against
appeals by the Commonwealth, habeas corpus was a civil proceed-
ing and the respondent would be permitted to appeal an adverse
decision on a writ of habeas corpus. The court also ruled that the
prisoner had the burden of proof, especially as to a claimed knowing
use by the Commonwealth of perjured or false testimony and a
demonstration of mere inconsistencies would be insufficient to sus-
tain this burden. 3 In Smyth v. Midgett, 4 the court reaffirmed its
prior view of the role of habeas corpus:
Habeas corpus is a writ of inquiry granted to determine whether a
person is illegally detained. Code, § 8-596. It can not be used to
perform the function of an appeal or writ of error, to review errors, or
to modify or revise a judgment of conviction pronounced by a court
of competent jurisdiction. It can not be used to secure a judicial
determination of any question which, even if determined in the pris-
oner's favor, could not affect the lawfulness of his immediate custody
and detention. In other words, a prisoner is entitled to immediate
release by habeas corpus if he is presently restrained of his liberty
without warrant of law. 5
Even prior to the 1963 decisions of the United States Supreme
Court expanding the role of habeas corpus, the Supreme Court of
91. 187 Va. at 528, 47 S.E.2d at 445. See also Council v. Smyth, 201 Va. 135, 109 S.E.2d
116 (1959); Royster v. Smyth, 195 Va. 228, 77 S.E.2d 855 (1953); Thornhill v. Smyth, 185 Va.
986, 41 S.E.2d 11 (1947); Harmon v. Smyth, 183 Va. 414, 32 S.E.2d 665 (1945).
92. 188 Va. 753, 51 S.E.2d 230 (1949).
93. Id. at 768-73, 51 S.E.2d at 236-39. See also Penn v. Smyth, 188 Va. 367, 49 S.E.2d 600
(1948).
94. 199 Va. 727, 101 S.E.2d 575 (1958).
95. Id. at 730, 101 S.E.2d at 578. The court had previously reasserted this view in Council
v. Smyth, 201 Va. 135, 139-40, 109 S.E.2d 116, 119 (1959), relying on Justice Jackson's
concurring opinion in Brown v. Allen, supra note 53. See also Smyth v. Bunch, 202 Va. 126,
116 S.E.2d 33 (1960); Smyth v. Morrison, 200 Va. 728, 107 S.E.2d 430 (1959); Hanson v.
Smyth, 183 Va. 384, 32 S.E.2d 142 (1944); Hobson v. Youell, 177 Va. 906, 15 S.E.2d 76 (1941).
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Appeals of Virginia dealt with procedural questions in such a way
as to remove technical impediments to the writ. In Morris v.
Smyth,9 the court ruled that a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
cannot be dismissed without calling for a response where the allega-
tions of the petition as pleaded, if true, would entitle the prisoner
to relief. In Cunningham v. Frye" the court decided that, if the
alleged issues were based on unrecorded matters of fact, the case
should be referred to the sentencing court for a plenary hearing. 8
The year following the 1963 federal decisions the Virginia court,
citing Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in Brown v. Allen, ruled
that a judgment of first degree murder resulting from a manslaugh-
ter indictment was not void, but merely voidable, and habeas cor-
pus could not lie since the sole "remedy in such cases is by a writ
of error."99
In 1964, in Griffin v. Cunningham,'0 the court appeared to de-
viate from its prior positions in the following language:
We find no merit in the suggestion of respondent that petitioner is
not entitled to bring this habeas corpus proceeding, but instead
should have appealed from the March 19, 1956 judgment of the cir-
cuit court. It is well settled that the deprivation of a constitutional
right of a prisoner may be raised by habeas corpus.'°'
The proposition that the court refers to as being well settled had not,
in fact, previously been asserted in earlier decisions of the court,
including those cases cited by the court to support the statement.
In Peyton v. Williams'°2 the Virginia Supreme Court acknowl-
edged that "the concept of the scope of the writ of habeas corpus
has been expanded in recent years by statutes and court decisions
in some of the states, and by the federal courts with regard to what
constitutes 'detention' or 'custody',"'' ° but the court declined to do
96. 202 Va. 832, 120 S.E.2d 465 (1961).
97. 203 Va. 539, 125 S.E.2d 846 (1962).
98. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8-598 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
99. Cunningham v. Hayes, 204 Va. 851, 859, 134 S.E.2d 271, 277 (1964).
100. 205 Va. 349, 136 S.E.2d 840 (1964).
101. Id. at 355, 136 S.E.2d at 845.
102. 206 Va. 595, 145 S.E.2d 147 (1965).
103. Id. at 601, 145 S.E.2d at 151. See also Blowe v. Peyton, 208 Va. 68, 155 S.E.2d 351
(1967).
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so itself. Nonetheless, in Darnell v. Peyton,1' 4 the court did expand
the preexisting rights of a habeas petitioner by affirming a right to
the assistance of counsel during a plenary hearing where "substan-
tial" issues are involved. A persistent claim in habeas corpus peti-
tions has naturally been that the prisoner was denied the effective
assistance of counsel. The Virginia Supreme Court has just as per-
sistently tested such a claim by the standard that such "representa-
tion was so ineffective as to make the trial a farce and a mockery of
justice."'' 5 Despite criticism of the "mockery" and "farce" rule the
Supreme Court of Virginia has adhered to that standard without
deviation. '06
In Brooks v. Peyton,107 the Virginia court reiterated the pre-Griffin
view of habeas corpus as being limited in its reach to jurisdictional
defects. The court said:
In the present proceeding the petitioner is seeking to employ a writ
of habeas corpus as a substitute for an appeal or writ of error. The
function of a writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into jurisdictional
defects amounting to want of legal authority for the detention of a
person on whose behalf it is asked. The court in which a writ is sought
examines only the power and authority of the court to act, not the
correctness of its conclusions, and the petition for a writ may not be
used as a substitute for an appeal or writ of error. '
Other recent cases have dealt with such procedural matters as the
104. 208 Va. 675, 160 S.E.2d 749 (1968).
105. Anderson v. Peyton, 209 Va. 798, 799, 167 S.E.2d 111 (1969). See also Root v. Cun-
ningham, 344 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1965); Ford v. Peyton, 209 Va. 203, 163 S.E.2d 314 (1968);
Peyton v. Fields, 207 Va. 40, 147 S.E.2d 762 (1966); Hoffler v. Peyton, 207 Va. 302, 149 S.E.2d
893 (1966); Penn v. Smyth, 188 Va. 367, 49 S.E.2d 600 (1948). This test has recently been
criticized by Professor Harvey Bines of the University of Virginia in Bines, Remedying Inef-
fective Representation in Criminal Cases: Departures from Habeas Corpus, 59 VA. L. REv.
927 (1973). Professor Bines suggests a standard similar to that applied in malpractice cases
whereby an accused is entitled to "the exercise of the customary skill and knowledge which
normally prevails at the time and place" relying on Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730
(3d Cir. 1970). 59 VA. L. R.v. at 932-33.
106. See, e.g., Slayton v. Weinberger, 213 Va. 690, 691-92, 194 S.E.2d 703, 704-05 (1973);
Hern v. Cox, 212 Va. 644, 647, 186 S.E.2d 85, 87 (1972); Davis v. Peyton, 211 Va. 525, 178
S.E.2d 679 (1971); Wynn v. Peyton, 211 Va. 515, 178 S.E.2d 676 (1971); Abbott v. Peyton,
211 Va. 484, 486, 178 S.E.2d 521, 523 (1971); Miracle v. Peyton, 211 Va. 123, 176 S.E.2d 339
(1970); Eller v. Peyton, 210 Va. 454, 171 S.E.2d 671 (1970).
107. 210 Va. 318, 171 S.E.2d 243 (1969).
108. Id. at 321, 171 S.E.2d at 246.
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inability of habeas corpus to reach a fully served sentence," 9 the fact
that an indigent prisoner is not entitled to a free copy of the tran-
script of his trial without showing a particularized need for same, ""
the discretion resting in the habeas judge as to whether counsel will
be appointed on appeal from a denial of habeas relief,'1 and the
holding that res judicata does not apply to habeas corpus, although
in the absence of a change in circumstances previous determinations
of issues will be conclusive. 1 2
A striking sidelight to this survey of the development of Virginia
law on habeas corpus is the parallel metamorphosis of Virginia's
Constitution. As previously pointed out, the Constitution of 1830
contained a blanket prohibition against the suspension of the writ
of habeas corpus"' but this language was subsequently modified to
conform to the language of the suspension clause in the United
States Constitution." ' When the Virginia Constitution was last re-
vised in 1971, the revision process was initiated by a Commission
on Constitutional Revision which, among other things, recom-
mended that habeas corpus be removed from the original jurisdic-
tion of the Virginia Supreme Court "for the practical reason that it
has proved uneconomical."" 5 This argument, however, proved un-
persuasive as the House of Delegates of the Virginia General Assem-
bly allowed the Virginia court to retain jurisdiction, because they
"felt it important that everyone in this State should have the chance
to go to some other judge or another court other than the court
which sentenced him. . .. ,,I The action of the House was agreed
to by the Senate and Article VI, Section 1, is the end result."17
109. Moore v. Peyton, 211 Va. 119, 176 S.E.2d 427 (1970); Blair v. Peyton, 210 Va. 416,
171 S.E.2d 690 (1970).
110. McCoy v. Lankford, 210 Va. 264, 170 S.E.2d 11 (1969).
111. Cooper v. Haas, 210 Va. 279, 170 S.E.2d 5 (1969).
112. Hawks v. Cox, 211 Va. 91, 175 S.E.2d 271 (1970).
113. See text accompanying note 77.
114. VA. CONST. art. I, § 9 is now substantially similar, with reference to habeas corpus,
as U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 (found at note 25 supra).
115. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION 187-88 (1969).
116. PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE VIRGINIA HOUSE OF DELEGATES PERTAINING TO AMEND-
MENT OF THE CONSTITUTION 120-21, 568, 721, 777 (1973). See also PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF
THE SENATE OF VIRGINIA PERTAINING TO AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION 502 (1972).
117. VA. CONST. art. VI, § I.
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THE BURGER COURT
Against this broad historical backdrop other forces-political,
social, economic-were playing their inexorable roles. Habeas cor-
pus has seldom been a totally obscure writ and many of its develop-
mental plateaus have been accompanied by widespread publicity.
It has not only been a legal force for the assertion of individual rights
but it has also been a necessarily political instrument in the arena
of government. As previously pointed out, habeas corpus was used
in England as the testing ground between Parliament and the
Crown"' and in America it became, in microcosm, a symbol of the
ebb and flow of power between the federal government and the
states. It could be said that the history of federalism is reflected in
the development of habeas corpus.
In England the writ had the effect of drawing to the royal courts
much of the power from inferior and local courts and it thus became
a significant centralizing force just as it has, albeit unconsciously,
become a centralizing force in the criminal justice system in Amer-
ica." 9 This effect in the two countries has been compared in the
following terms:
While the centralizing effect of medieval habeas corpus seems to have
been salutary for Britain, the apprehensions in some quarters today
are that this may be unhealthy for American constitutionalism and
hence, in the long run, for liberty under law.'
These apprehensions have been shared by many other commenta-
tors, few of whom could be classed as reactionary alarmists.' More
importantly, these concerns have increasingly been shared by a sub-
stantial segment of the general public.
During the 1960's the expansion of rights for criminal defendants
and the extension of these expanded rights to state criminal defen-
118. See text accompanying notes 13-21 supra.
119. MEADOR at 74-75.
120. MEADOR at 75.
121. See, e.g., Bator supra note 49; Doub, The Case Against Modern Federal Habeas
Corpus, 57 A.B.A.J. 323 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Doub]; Friendly, Is Innocence Irrele-
vant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. Cai. L. REV. 142 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as Friendly]; Santarelli, Too Much Is Enough, 9 TRiAL, #3, p. 40 (1973); Symposium,
Applications for Writs of Habeas Corpus and Post Conviction Review of Sentences in the
United States Courts, 33 F.R.D. 363 (1963).
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dants by the federal courts stimulated a political reaction, ex-
pressed through the rhetorical slogans of "law and order" or "crime
in the streets" or, as phrased by two astute political theorists, the
"Social Issue.1' 22 The "Social Issue" involved many different ele-
ments but its core was the concern of middle income and blue collar
voters over crime and personal safety. 23 The reaction manifested
itself in the polling booth, and more attention began to be paid to
higher police salaries, better criminal investigative techniques and
improved criminal justice services." 4 The electorate also stimulated
the appointment of more judges described as "strict construction-
ists." Thus the appointment of four new Justices to the United
States Supreme Court heralded a new era in criminal law and in the
ongoing transmutation of habeas corpus.
In a short span of four or five years the Burger Court has dealt
more with the procedural aspects of habeas corpus than the Warren
Court did in a decade. The first significant habeas corpus case de-
cided on procedural grounds by the Burger Court was Picard v.
Connor, 25 which dealt with the exhaustion of state remedies re-
quirement of 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In Picard a state prisoner attacked
his indictment on appeal in a state court because the procedures
used to amend it were not in compliance with state law. On federal
habeas corpus, however, the prisoner alleged that the procedure
denied him equal protection of the laws under the fourteenth
amendment. The Court held there had been no exhaustion of state
court remedies in this situation and Mr. Justice Brennan's majority
opinion unequivocally stated:
We emphasize that the federal claim must be fairly presented to the
state courts. If the exhaustion doctrine is to prevent "unnecessary
conflict between courts equally bound to guard and protect rights
secured by the Constitution,". . . it is not sufficient merely that the
federal habeas applicant has been through the state courts. The rule
would serve no purpose if it could be satisfied by raising one claim
122. R. SCAMMON & B. WArENBERG, THE REAL MAJomry (1970).
123. Id. at 20-21, 35-44.
124. An example of this concern was the passage of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 197, 683, 1236, which spawned the Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration and its state progeny, thereby infusing new vitality into the processes of
criminal justice, from crime prevention through parole and other post-sentence services.
125. 404 U.S. 270 (1971).
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in the state courts and another in the federal courts. Only if the state
courts have had the first opportunity to hear the claim sought to be
vindicated in a federal habeas proceeding does it make sense to speak
of the exhaustion of state remedies. 126
The net effect of the Burger Court decisions has been to limit the
accessability of federal habeas corpus to prisoners convicted in state
courts. For example, the first habeas corpus case, Boyd v. Dutton, '2
involving the present membership of the Court resulted in a five-
to-four decision with White, Burger, Powell and Rehnquist dissent-
ing. The Court held that a federal evidentiary hearing was required
where the facts essential to a full determination of the petitioner's
claim, that he was denied counsel at his trial, had not been fully
developed during the state habeas corpus hearing. But this holding
was limited, however, by the Court a year later in La Vallee v. Delle
Rose, 1' wherein the petitioner alleged that his confession was invol-
untary and that the state court had failed to make an adequate
determination of the factual issues involved. The federal district
court and the court of appeals had agreed with the petitioner but
the Supreme Court reversed on the ground that the state court had
made an adequate determination and the burden was on the peti-
tioner to establish by convincing evidence that the conclusion was
erroneous.
Further restrictions imposed by the decision in McMann v.
Richardson' tended to insulate guilty pleas from collateral attack.
The Court held that the entry of a plea of guilty after advice of
counsel which "was within the range of competence demanded of
attorneys in criminal cases" amounts to a waiver of any claim of
coerced confession or other similar pretrial deficit.13' In Nelson v.
George3' the Court determined that a California prisoner, attacking
on federal constitutional grounds the validity of a North Carolina
conviction supporting a detainer filed against him with California
126. 404 U.S. at 275-76 (citations omitted).
127. 405 U.S. 1 (1972).
128. 410 U.S. 690 (1973).
129. 397 U.S. 759 (1970). See Dukes v. Warden, 406 U.S. 250 (1972); Note, McMann v.
Richardson: A Restrictive Delineation of the Habeas Corpus Remedy, 31 Omo ST. L.J. 852
(1970); 48 J. URBAN L. 989 (1971).
130. 397 U.S. at 771.
131. 399 U.S. 224 (1970).
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penal authorities, must exhaust his California state remedies with
regard to his claim that the detainer affects his detention in that
state, and in Slayton v. Smith,1 2 a case from Virginia, the Court
ruled that, absent special circumstances, a federal court should dis-
miss a petition for failure to exhaust available state court remedies
rather than retaining the case on its docket pending exhaustion.
The pace of procedural concerns quickened, and the restrictions
on habeas corpus increased during the last half of 1972 in the deci-
sions in Milton v. Wainwright'3 and Murch v. Mottram.1 34 In Milton
the Court was presented with a claim that a confession was involun-
tary under fifth amendment standards and was additionally ob-
tained in violation of the sixth amendment. The Court decided the
case on the basis of the harmless error doctrine' 35 with the following
conclusive language by Chief Justice Burger:
The writ of habeas corpus has limited scope; the federal courts do not
sit to re-try state cases de novo but, rather, to review for violation of
federal constitutional standards. In that process we do not close our
eyes to the reality of overwhelming evidence of guilt fairly established
in the state court 14 years ago by use of evidence not challenged here;
the use of the additional evidence challenged in this proceeding and
arguably open to challenge was, beyond reasonable doubt, harm-
less. 3
In Murch the Supreme Court decided that a state prisoner had
deliberately by-passed state procedures, thus barring federal habeas
corpus relief, by failing to assert certain claims in the state habeas
hearing. Neil v. Biggers'37 presented the intriguing question as to
whether an affirmance of a conviction by an equally divided Court
would bar subsequent habeas corpus relief. The Court concluded
that it would not.
132. 404 U.S. 53 (1971).
133. 407 U.S. 371 (1972).
134. 409 U.S. 41 (1972). See Comment, Murch v. Mottram: Repetitious Habeas Corpus-A
Possible Breakthrough, 1973 UTAH L. REv. 94 (1973).
135. See Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S.
18 (1967).
136. 407 U.S. at 377-78.
137. 409 U.S. 188 (1972). See Note, Criminal Procedure-Equal Affirmance- What Legal
Effect on Habeas Corpus, 24 MERCER L. REv. 953 (1973); 50 J. URBAN L. 519 (1973).
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Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky 3 dealt with
the troublesome problem as to the proper site for the filing of a
habeas corpus petition where the prisoner is detained in one state
and is attacking the conviction of another state. Three of the Nixon
appointees dissented-Mr. Justice Blackmun concurred, with some
reservations-from the decision of the Court allowing a prisoner
physically present in a state A to attack, in a federal court in state
A, a conviction of state B filed as a detainer against him. In Hensley
v. Municipal Court 31 the Court, over the strong dissent of Mr. Jus-
tice Rehnquist, joined by Justice Powell and Chief Justice Burger,
expanded the concept of custody to allow a state prisoner free on his
recognizance to attack his conviction.
Two companion cases, Davis v. United States"' and Tollett v.
Henderson,' deal with a question that should become increasingly
significant as it may represent a return to the doctrine of Daniels v.
Allen' and a restriction on one of the touchstones of Fay. In both
cases the Court dealt with claims of systematic exclusion of blacks
from grand juries that returned indictments against the prisoners.
Henderson had pleaded guilty and the Court ruled that this act
constituted a waiver of the grand jury claim despite the fact that
there was no knowing or intelligent waiver because neither the pris-
oner nor his attorney was aware of the allegedly deficient nature of
the grand jury selection process.4 3 Davis was a federal post-
conviction proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, in which the Su-
preme Court ruled that the claim was barred by Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 12(b)(2), which provided that a challenge to an
138. 410 U.S. 484 (1973). See Comment, Criminal Procedure: Habeas Corpus-Federal
District Court Jurisdiction, 13 WASHBURN L. REV. 134 (1974); 40 BROOKLYN L. REv. 475 (1973);
41 TENN. L. REV. 167 (1973).
139. 411 U.S. 345 (1973). For the exercise of habeas corpus by a prisoner released on parole,
see note 69 and accompanying text supra.
140. 411 U.S. 233 (1973).
141. 411 U.S. 258 (1973).
142. See note 57 supra.
143. In Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972), the Court recognized the right of a white
petitioner to raise a question of the systematic exclusion of blacks from grand and petit juries,
despite the fact that this claim had apparently not been asserted in the state courts. The
Peters opinion failed, however, to address directly the crucial fact that the jury selection issue
was not raised at the original trial despite state procedures requiring the assertion of such a
claim at trial. Tollett v. Henderson may provide an answer to the question never confronted
in Peters-whether the failure of petitioner to raise the issue of jury selection in a state court
precludes his reliance on it in a federal writ of habeas corpus.
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indictment must be made before trial, and no such challenge had
been made by Davis. The implications of the Davis case, in particu-
lar, may be far reaching if the rationale is applied to state court
convictions to preclude federal habeas corpus relief if the claim was
not properly raised under state statutes or procedural rules.
Preiser v. Rodriguez4 dealt not only with habeas corpus but also
with the rising number of civil rights suits filed by prisoners under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court ruled that a claim by a prisoner deal-
ing with good time credits or similar claims regarding the length of
custody were appropriately a claim for habeas corpus relief rather
than a civil rights suit and such a claim, unlike a civil rights claim,
would have to be asserted first in the state courts under the exhaus-
tion of remedies doctrine. Donnelly v. De Christoforo145 dealt with a
challenged argument by a prosecutor, wherein the Court, although
somewhat critical of the argument, concluded that they did "...
not believe that this incident made respondent's trial so fundamen-
tally unfair as to deny him due process."''
The pole star, however, for any substantial judicial restructuring
of federal habeas corpus remedies must be Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte,47 particularly Mr. Justice Powell's concurring opinion
in that case. The case involved a search and seizure question and
the majority opinion, by Mr. Justice Stewart, disposed of the peti-
tioner's claim on the merits of the allegation. Mr. Justice Powell,
however, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Mr. Justice Rehnquist,
suggested an alternative ground of decision. Justice Powell argued
that the overriding issue was "the extent to which federal habeas
corpus should be available to a state prisoner seeking to exclude
evidence from an allegedly unlawful search and seizure." ' The
opinion further argued that the sole question in such a case should
be "whether the petitioner was provided a fair opportunity to raise
and have adjudicated the question in state courts.' 4 Justice Powell
144. 411 U.S. 475 (1973). Flannery, Habeas Corpus Bores a Hole in Prisoners' Civil Rights
Actions-An Analysis of Preiser v. Rodriguez, 48 ST. JOHN's L. Rav. 104 (1973); Plotkin,
Rotten to the "Core of Habeas Corpus": The Supreme Court and the Limitations on a
Prisoner's Right to Sue; Preiser v. Rodriguez, 9 CM. L. Bum. 518 (1973).
145. - U.S. -, 94 S.Ct. 1868 (1974).
146. 94 S.Ct. at 1872.
147. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
148. Id. at 250.
149. Id.
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traced the arguments regarding the correctness of the legal history
of habeas corpus as reviewed in Fay and he concluded that the
Court deserved low marks as a legal historian. Justice Powell con-
tinued:
No effective judicial system can afford to concede the continuing
theoretical possibility that there is error in every trial and that every
incarceration is unfounded. At some point the law must convey to
those in custody that a wrong has been committed, that consequent
punishment has been imposed, that one should no longer look back
with the view to resurrecting every imaginable basis for further litiga-
tion but rather should look forward to rehabilitation and to becoming
a constructive citizen.
Nowhere should the merit of this view be more self-evident than
in collateral attack on an allegedly unlawful search and seizure,
where the petitioner often asks society to redetermine a claim with
no relationship at all to the justness of his confinement. Professor
Amsterdam has noted that "for reasons which are common to all
search and seizure claims," he "would hold even a slight finality
interest sufficient to deny the collateral remedy." But, in fact, a
strong finality interest militates against allowing collateral review of
search and seizure claims. Apart from the duplication of resources
inherent in most habeas corpus proceedings, the validity of a search
and seizure claim frequently hinges on a complex matrix of events
which may be difficult indeed for the habeas court to disinter espe-
cially where, as often happens, the trial occurred years before the
collateral attack and the state record is thinly sketched.
Finally, the present scope of habeas corpus tends to undermine the
values inherent in our federal system of government. To the extent
that every state criminal judgment is to be subject indefinitely to
broad and repetitive federal oversight, we render the actions of state
courts a serious disrespect in derogation of the constitutional balance
between the two systems. The present expansive scope of federal
habeas review has prompted no small friction between state and fed-
eral judiciaries. '50
Mr. Justice Powell discussed at some length articles by Judge
Friendly' 1 and Professor Bator'52 and the dissenting opinion by Jus-
150. Id. at 262-63 (footnotes omitted).
151. See note 121 supra.
152. See note 49 supra.
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tice Black in Kaufman v. United States,'53 and he concluded with
the following observations:
Perhaps no single development of the criminal law has had conse-
quences so profound as the escalating use, over the past two decades,
of federal habeas corpus to reopen and readjudicate state criminal
judgments. I have commented in Part IV above on the far-reaching
consequences: the burden on the system, in terms of demands on the
courts, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and other personnel and facili-
ties; the absence of efficiency and finality in the criminal process,
frustrating both the deterrent function of the law and the effective-
ness of rehabilitation; the undue subordination of state courts, with.
the resulting exacerbation of state-federal relations; and the subtle
erosion of the doctrine of federalism itself. Perhaps the single most
disquieting consequence of open-ended habeas review is reflected in
the prescience of Mr. Justice Jackson's warning that "[i]t must
prejudice the occasional meritorious application to be buried in a
flood of worthless ones."
If these consequences flowed from the safe-guarding of constitu-
tional claims of innocence they should, of course, be accepted as a
tolerable price to pay for cherished standards of justice at the same
time that efforts are pursued to find more rational procedures. Yet,
as illustrated by the case before us today, the question on habeas
corpus is too rarely whether the prisoner was innocent of the crime
for which he was convicted and too frequently whether some evidence
of undoubted probative value has been admitted in violation of an
exclusionary rule ritualistically applied without due regard to
whether it has the slightest likelihood of achieving its avowed prophy-
lactic purpose.'
Mr. Justice Blackmun stated in his concurring opinion that he
agreed "with nearly all Mr. Justice Powell has to say in his detailed
and persuasive concurring opinion" but he refrained from joining it
because it was not necessary to reconsider Kaufman at that point."'
Mr. Justice Stewart similarly stated that he did not deal with the
question in Mr. Justice Powell's opinion because he had found "no
valid Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claim in this case."'
153. 394 U.S. 217, 242 (1969).
154. 412 U.S. at 274-75 (footnotes omitted).
155. Id. at 249.
156. Id.
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Thus, at least three Justices agreed with Justice Powell and, addi-
tionally, it must be remembered that Justice Stewart had dissented
in both Fay and Kaufman.'57
With the exceptions of Braden and Hensley the decisions of the
Supreme Court since the beginning of the Burger era have repre-
sented an effort to constrict the scope of federal habeas corpus to
fit the bounds existing for the writ prior to the expansionism of the
previous decade. Those exceptions relate only to the definition of
"custody" within the context of the federal habeas corpus legisla-
tion. Practically every other case has involved the expression of a
growing concern for the restoration of a balance between state and
federal court systems in criminal justice matters.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN VIRGINIA
The process of reexamining the scope and role of habeas corpus
has not been limited to the Supreme Court of the United States.
Two recent decisions of the Virginia Supreme Court have redefined
the procedural role of habeas corpus in Virginia. Smith v.
Superintendent' raised the question of the standing of a prisoner
detained under a recidivism sentence to attack the validity of an
underlying conviction on habeas corpus. The court pointed out that
counsel is provided for a prisoner in a recidivist proceeding and a
full opportunity is provided at that time to attack the validity of the
underlying convictions. Consequently, the failure to assert such an
allegation during the recidivism proceeding itself results in a conclu-
sive waiver of any objection.'59 In addition the court made some
general observations on habeas corpus:
It is not necessary to cite statistics to demonstrate the extent to which
the judicial process in this state has been impeded in recent years by
the unrestricted filing of applications for habeas corpus. The prolifer-
ation of such applications in this court alone stands as ready proof of
the significant extra burden imposed upon our judicial system.
In the interest of speedy justice for all, it is the duty of this court
to strive to eliminate every unwarranted impediment to the judicial
157. See 372 U.S. at 448; 394 U.S. at 242. Justice Powell reiterated his position in the later
case of Cardwell v. Lewis, - U.S. -, 94 S.Ct. 2464 (1974).
158. 214 Va. 359, 200 S.E.2d 523 (1973).
159. Id. at 361, 200 S.E.2d at 524-25.
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process. On the other hand, reasonable access to the Great Writ
should not be lightly denied.
However, as we have seen, an alleged recidivist has the unlimited
right to attack in the recidivism proceeding the validity of underlying
convictions. He also has the right to the assistance of counsel in such
a proceeding. And he has the right to seek an appeal to this court. In
light of these circumstances, we consider it a necessary impingement
upon the availability of habeas corpus to limit the right to attack a
prior conviction, the sentence for which has been fully served, to the
recidivism proceeding itself.
If the attack upon such a prior conviction is made in the recidivism
proceeding and is unsuccessful, the prisoner may only seek an appeal
to this court. But if he does not seek an appeal, he may not later
attack the same conviction by habeas corpus, because habeas corpus
cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal. See Brooks v. Peyton,
210 Va. 318, 321, 171 S.E.2d 243, 246 (1969). And if the attack is not
made in the recidivism proceeding, any objection to an underlying
conviction, must be deemed to have been waived and cannot be the
subject of a subsequent petition for habeas corpus. These rules apply
unless, following conclusion of the recidivism proceeding, a new and
retroactive constitutional principle is enunciated affecting the valid-
ity of such a prior conviction. 6'
Finally, in Slayton v. Parrigan,16 ' the court dealt with an appeal
by the Superintendent of the Virginia State Penitentiary from a
grant of habeas corpus relief by the Circuit Court of Dickenson
County to a prisoner who successfully urged that he was being ille-
gally detained because of an unnecessarily suggestive pretrial iden-
tification procedure. It was admitted that no objection to either the
pretrial or in-court identification was made at trial. The prisoner
similarly conceded that he had not relayed to trial counsel any of
the facts surrounding the allegation, and the habeas court ruled that
the trial defense counsel was effective. The Superintendent's central
claim on appeal was that the prisoner had no standing to raise a
claim not noted at trial, even a claim of constitutional dimensions,
in the absence of: (1) a finding of ineffective counsel; (2) a change
in the law affecting the claim; (3) a finding that the prisoner was in
some way deprived by the state or the court of a fair opportunity to
160. Id. at 363, 200 S.E.2d at 525-26.
161. 215 Va. 27, 205 S.E.2d 680 (1974).
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present the claim; or (4) a determination that the claim was of
jurisdictional dimensions in the narrow sense of jurisdiction. The
court responded to this argument in the following terms:
We agree with the respondent's contention that the petitioner lacked
standing to raise on habeas corpus the question whether his in-court
identification by Yates was tainted by an impermissibly suggestive
pretrial identification when he did not advance that defense at his
trial and upon appeal from that conviction.
Assuming, without deciding, that petitioner Was subject to an un-
constitutional identification procedure, the court below erred, absent
a showing of ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to raise that
question, in permitting inquiry on this question for the first time in
the habeas corpus proceeding.
We have repeatedly held that under Rule 1:8, now Rule 5:7, an
objection requiring a ruling of the trial court must be made during
trial when identification testimony is offered or it will not be noticed
upon appeal. Poole v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 258, 260, 176 S.E.2d
821, 823 (1970); Henry v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 48, 52, 175 S.E.2d
416, 419 (1970).
A petition for a writ of habeas corpus may not be employed as a
substitute for an appeal or a writ of error. Brooks v. Peyton, 210 Va.
318, 321-22, 171 S.E.2d 243, 246 (1969); Smyth v. Bunch, 202 Va. 126,
131, 116 S.E.2d 33, 37-38 (1960).
It is true we said in Griffin v. Cunningham, 205 Va. 349, 355, 136
S.E.2d 840, 845 (1964): "It is well settled that the deprivation of a
constitutional right of a prisoner may be raised by 'habeas corpus.'"
But in the interest of the finality of judgments and since the original
function of the writ of habeas corpus was to provide an inquiry into
jurisdictional defects, we hold that the principle enunciated in Griffin
is inapplicable when a prisoner has been afforded a fair and full
opportunity to raise and have adjudicated the question of the admis-
sibility of evidence in his trial and upon appeal. [citing concurring
opinion of Mr. Justice Powell in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
218, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 2059 (1973); Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and
Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 441
(1963); Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Crimi-
nal Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142, 160 (1970) [other citations
omitted].
The trial and appellate procedures in Virginia are adequate in
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meeting procedural requirements to adjudicate State and Federal
constitutional rights and to supply a suitable record for possible ha-
beas corpus review. A prisoner is not entitled to use habeas corpus to
circumvent the trial and appellate processes for an inquiry into an
alleged non-jurisdictional defect of a judgment of conviction. Since
the issue of the alleged constitutionally improper pre-trial identifica-
tion could have been raised and adjudicated at petitioner's trial and
upon his appeal to this court, Parrigan had no standing to attack his
final judgment of conviction by habeas corpus.1 12
The issue is thus joined. The Virginia Supreme Court has made
a calculated decision to restore to the writ of habeas corpus the
historical dimensions that attached prior to the developments of the
last quarter century. The question then becomes whether Virginia's
view of the scope of the writ will be recognized in the federal
courts.'63
CONCLUSION
At the outset of this article it was noted that the role of habeas
corpus has been much debated in recent years. That debate has
undoubtedly received new shades and tints when viewed through
the multi faceted prisms of Schneckloth and Parrigan. A number of
proposals have been made to deal with the warnings of Mr. Justice
Jackson in his concurring opinion in Brown v. Allen when he said:
[Tihis Court has sanctioned progressive trivialization of the writ
until floods of stale, frivolous and repetitious petitions inundate the
docket of the lower courts and swell our own. . . . It must prejudice
the occasional meritorious application to be buried in a flood of
worthless ones. He who must search a haystack for a needle is likely
to end up with the attitude that the needle is not worth the search.164
Some of those proposals have been extreme, including the abolition
of habeas corpus. On the other extreme have been advocates of an
even greater expansion of federal habeas corpus, such as to the
162. 215 Va. at 29-30, 205 S.E.2d at 682 (footnotes omitted).
163. See White, Federal Habeas Corpus: The Impact of the Failure to Assert a Constitu-
tional Claim at Trial, 58 VA. L. Rsv. 67 (1972).
164. 344 U.S. 443 at 536-37 (1952) (citations omitted).
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pretrial stage of state criminal prosecutions." 5 However, most rec-
ommendations for reform have reflected moderation' and many of
the writ's defenders have exhibited a balanced analysis of the prob-
lem. 67
Space does not permit a discussion of all these proposals but most
of the attention of both the United States Supreme Court and the
Virginia Supreme Court has focused on the analysis of Professor
Bator 8 and Judge Friendly.6 ' Judge Friendly's basic "thesis is that,
with a few important exceptions, convictions should be subject to
collateral attack only when the prisoner supplements his constitu-
tional plea with a colorable claim of innocence."'70 He would partic-
ularly apply such a rule in search and seizure claims and claims
involving voluntary confessions obtained in violation of Miranda v.
Arizona,'7' both situations where the reliability of the evidence is
unquestioned. As noted above, 72 Mr. Justice Powell in Schneckloth
relied quite heavily on Judge Friendly's article because of the search
and seizure issue presented in that case.
Professor Bator's article appears more persuasive and his discus-
sion more to the point on the basic issues involved in federal habeas
corpus. Bator postulates that our interminable insistence on repeti-
tive review of criminal convictions reflects a "general and deep-
seated uneasiness about the ethical and psychological premises of
the criminal process itself."'' 73 He argues that finality in the criminal
165. See, e.g., Amsterdam, Criminal Prosecutions Affecting Federally Guaranteed Civil
Rights: Federal Removal and Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction to Abort State Court Trial, 113 U.
PA. L. REv. 793 (1965).
166. See, e.g., Bator, supra note 49; Doub, supra note 121; Friendly, supra note 121.
167. See, e.g., Chisum, In Defense of Modern Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners,
21 DEPAUL L. REv. 682 (1972); LaFrance, Federal Habeas Corpus and State Prisoners: Who's
Responsible?, 58 A.B.A.J. 610 (1972); Lay, Modern Administrative Proposals for Federal
Habeas Corpus: The Rights of Prisoners Preserved, 21 DEPAuL L. Rev. 701 (1972); Pollak,
Proposals to Curtail Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners: Collateral Attack on the
Great Writ, 66 YALE L.J. 50 (1956); Wulf, Limiting Prisoner Access to Habeas Car-
pus-Assault on the Great Writ, 40 BROOKLYN L. Rev. 253 (1973); Note, Proposed Modifica-
tion of Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners-Reform or Revocation?, 61 GEo. L.J. 1221
(1973).
168. See note 121 supra.
169. See note 49 supra.
170. Friendly at 142. Judge Friendly relies quite heavily on Justice Black's dissenting
opinion in Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 235-36 (1969).
171. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
172. See text accompanying note 151 supra.
173. Bator at 442.
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process is a critical element and "it is essential to the educational
and deterrent functions of the criminal law that we be able to say
that one violating that law will swiftly and certainly become subject
to punishment, just punishment."'74 The essence of Professor
Bator's argument is set forth in the concluding paragraph of his
article:
I continue to resist, in sum, the notion that the inquiry on habeas
should be mere repetition, an exact replica, of what has gone before.
I do not see that as institutionally justified. If we wish to have an
ultimate recourse, if we want to grant the federal courts a roving
extraordinary commission to undo injustice, then, it seems to me, all
the factors which bear on justice should be put on the scales. If Brown
v. Allen is to remain the law, it should be modified to make clear that
where a federal constitutional question has been fully canvassed by
fair state process, and meaningfully submitted for possible Supreme
Court review, then the federal district judge on habeas though enti-
tled to redetermine the merits, has a large discretion to decide
whether the federal error, if any, was prejudicial, whether justice will
be served by releasing the prisoner, taking into account in the largest
sense all the relevant factors, including his conscientious appraisal of
the guilt or innocence of the accused on the basis of the full record
before him."
Thus, § § 2253 and 2254 of Title 28 should be amended substan-
tially in accordance with the bill advocated by former Attorney
General Kleindienst in his letter to the Chairman of the House
Committee on the Judiciary.'7 ' The focus of federal habeas corpus
proceedings should be on the fairness of the state process for adjudi-
cating federal constitutional claims. In this regard, it cannot be
emphasized too strongly that much in the way of reform of state
criminal procedure has taken place in the past decade. 71 In state
habeas corpus proceedings the test should be that as articulated by
the Virginia Supreme Court in Parrigan.7 ' As Professor Bator as-
serted:
174. Id. at 452.
175. Id. at 527-28.
176. The recommendations of former Attorney General Kleindienst are contained in the
appendix hereto.
177. For example, in Virginia, the new Rules of Criminal Practice and Procedure, effective
January 1, 1972, were based largely on the Federal Rules of Criminal Practice and Procedure.
178. Any exceptions to the waiver rule should be similar to those advocated by the Superin-
tendent. See text accompanying note 161 supra.
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A procedural system which permits an endless repetition of inquiry
into facts and law in a vain search for ultimate certitude implies a
lack of confidence about the possibilities of justice that cannot but
war with the effectiveness of the underlying substantive commands.
Furthermore, we should at least tentatively inquire whether an end-
less reopening of convictions, with its continuing underlying implica-
tion that perhaps the defendant can escape from corrective sanctions
after all, can be consistent with the aim of rehabilitating offenders.",
This reassessment of habeas corpus is clearly necessary to restore
to the administration of criminal justice the elements of stability
and finality without which the correctional process has no chance
of success.
179. Bator at 452.
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APPENDIX
Justice Department Recommended Amendments to 28 United
States Code § § 2253 and 2254 Based on H.R. 13722
A BILL
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, That chapter 153
of title 28 of the United States Code is amended
(a) by amending sections 2253 to 2255 to read as follows:
"§ 2253. Appeal; State and Federal custody.
"In a habeas corpus proceeding or a proceeding under section 2255
of this title before a circuit or district judge, the final order shall be
subject to review, on appeal, by the court of appeals for the circuit
where the proceeding is had.
"There shall be no right to appeal from such an order in a proceed-
ing to test the validity of a warrant to remove, to another district or
place for commitment or trial, a person charged with a criminal of-
fense against the United States, or to test the validity of his detention
pending removal proceedings.
"An appeal may be taken to the court of appeals from the final
order in a habeas corpus proceeding or a proceeding under section
2255 of this title only if the court of appeals issues a certificate of
probable cause: Provided, however, That the certificate need not
issue in order for a State or the Federal Government to appeal the
final order.
"§ 2254. State custody; remedies in State courts.
"(a) The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a
district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas cor-
pus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a
State court only on the grounds that either:
"(1)(i) he is in custody in violation of the Constitution of the
United States, and
"(ii) the claimed constitutional violation presents a sub-
stantial question-
"(aa) which was not theretofore raised and deter-
mined, and
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"(bb) which there was no fair and adequate opportun-
ity theretofore to raise and have determined, and
"(cc) which cannot thereafter be raised and deter-
mined in the State court, and
"(iii) the claimed constitutional violation is of a right
which has as its primary purpose the protection of the reliability
of either the factfinding process at the trial or the appellate
process on appeal from the judgment of conviction: Provided,
however, That insofar as any constitutional claim of incompe-
tency of counsel is based on conduct of the counsel with respect
to constitutional claims barred by the previous language of this
subsection, the claim of incompetency of counsel shall to that
extent be likewise barred, and
"(iv) the petitioner shows that a different result would prob-
ably have obtained if such constitutional violation had not oc-
curred;
or
"(2) he is in custody in violation of the laws or treaties of the
United States.
"(b) A copy of the official records of the State court, duly certified
by the clerk of such court to be a true and correct copy of a finding,
judicial opinion, or other reliable written indicia showing a factual
determination by the State court shall be admissible in the Federal
court proceeding.
"§ 2255. Federal custody; remedies on motion attacking sentence.
"(a) A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established
by Act of Congress may move the court which imposed the sentence
to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence, if
"(1)(A) he is in custody in violation of the Constitution of
the United States, and
"(B) the claimed constitutional violation presents a
substantial question
"(i) which was not theretofore raised and determined,
and
"(ii) which there was no fair and adequate opportunity
theretofore to raise and have determined, and
"(C) the claimed constitutional violation is of a right
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which has as its primary purpose the protection of the reliability
of either the factfinding process at the trial or the appellate
process on appeal from the judgment of conviction: Provided,
That insofar as any constitutional claim of incompetency of
counsel is based on conduct of the counsel with respect to consti-
tutional claims barred by the previous language of this subsec-
tion, the claim of incompetency of counsel shall to that extent
be likewise barred, and
"(D) the petitioner shows that a different result would
probably have obtained if such constitutional violation had not
occurred; or
"(2) he is in custody in violation of the laws of the United
States; or
"(3) the sentence was imposed in violation of the laws of the
United States; or
"(4) the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sent-
ence; or
"(5) the sentence was in excess of the maximum authoriza-
tion by law; or
"(6) the sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack.
"(b) A motion for such relief may be made at any time.
"(c) Unless the motion and the files and records of the case con-
clusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court shall
cause notice thereof to be served upon the United States Attorney,
grant a prompt hearing thereon, determine the issues and make find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law with respect thereto. If the court
finds that the judgment was rendered without jurisdiction, or that the
sentence imposed was not authorized by law or is otherwise open to
collateral attack, or that there has been a denial or infringement of
the constitutional rights of the prisoner as described in subsection (a)
of this section, the court shall discharge the prisoner or resentence
him or grant a new trial or correct the sentence as may appear appro-
priate.
"(d) A court may entertain and determine such motion without
requiring the production of the prisoner at the hearing.
"(e) The sentencing court shall not be required to entertain a
second or successive motion for similar relief on behalf of the same
prisoner.
"(f) An appeal may be taken to the court of appeals from the
1974]
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order entered on the motion in accordance with section 2253 of this
title.
"(g) An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a
prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to
this section, shall not be entertained if it appears that the applicant
has failed to apply for relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced
him or that such court has denied him relief, unless it also appears
that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the
legality of his detention."
(b) by amending the analysis at the beginning of the chapter by
deleting "2253. Appeal." and inserting in lieu thereof "2253. Ap-
peal; State and Federal Custody."
